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When economies adjust to globalization, local resources
shift. Workers change jobs and internal migration ﬂows ensue,
depending on the degree of individual mobility. We study the
association between international economic integration and
domestic migration using linked employer–employee data that
comprehensively trace individual workers and their employers
over time in Brazil, a major developing country. Brazil under-
went salient eﬀorts to integrate its economy globally, and
simultaneously experienced accelerating domestic migration.
Formal sector migration reallocates resources across regions
and activities and is thus an important source of a country’s
gains from specialization after market oriented reforms.
Brazil has long exhibited high rates of internal migration,
similar to many developing countries. Over the past century,
massive ﬂows of internal migrants left states in the North
and Northeast for the growing urban centers in the Southeast,
and for Brası´lia. Migration has not subsided. To the contrary,
estimates of lifetime interstate migration rates grew from 20%
of the population in 1980 (Martine, 1990, chap. 2) to 40% of
the population in 1999 (Fiess & Verner, 2003). This migration
surge coincides with market oriented reforms, a shift in devel-
opment strategy towards regional policies that foster local eco-
nomic strengths, and Brazil’s progressing integration into the
global economy since the late 1980s. Brazil implemented major
trade reforms in the early 1990s, trade integration with its
Southern Cone neighbors in 1993, gradual Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) liberalizations over the 1990s, and an ex-
change rate devaluation in 1999 that facilitated foreign market
access for exporters. The total stock of FDI in Brazil, for in-
stance, stood at US$ 115.5 billion in 1995. Within ﬁve years,
this stock more than quintupled following Brazil’s trade and840capital account liberalizations and macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. Most foreign investments ﬂowed to newly privatized util-
ities and services companies, impacting industries beyond
manufacturing.
We document recent migration patterns across states in Bra-
zil using comprehensive and, in their scope, internationally
unprecedented linked employer–employee data for a develop-
ing country. The data show that one third of the job changing
workers in Brazil’s formal sector migrate across state borders
to ﬁnd new formal employment every year in the 1990s. Con-
trary to long term evidence from household cross-sections, we
show that recent annual migration ﬂows of formal sector
workers are directed towards uncommon destinations. Select
states in the Center-West, North and Northeast receive large
ﬂows of formal sector immigrants. This stands in contrast to
the assertion that the typical migrant ﬂow in Brazil runs from
the low income North to higher income South.
Our data link workers to their employers across all sectors
of the economy. The data are uniquely suited to investigate
how globalization related employer characteristics are associ-
ated with migration ﬂows. While most Brazilian formal
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ments, there are notable diﬀerences between migrants and
stayers in their exposure to multinational and exporting estab-
lishments. The average migrant in the sample is more likely to
move to a job at a foreign owned or exporting establishment
than a non-migrant. Job changers to foreign owned establish-
ments beneﬁt from a considerably steeper tenure wage proﬁle
than workers at domestic owned establishments.
We analyze these sample characteristics using the Dahl (2002)
methodology to account for the multiplicity of destination
choices that a migrant faces, while also controlling for within-
state job changes. Our estimates for the period during 1997–
2001 provide additional support for the idea that globalization
acts on internal migration through the growth of employment
opportunities at locations with a high concentration of foreign
owned establishments and the stability of employment at
exporting establishments. A 1% increase in exporter employ-
ment predicts a 0.3% reduced probability of migration, and a
1% increase in the concentration of foreign owned establish-
ments at potential destinations is associatedwith a 0.2% increase
in the migration rate. The importance of foreign owned estab-
lishments in the immigration region, beyond the spot wage, is
consistent with the economic rationale that migrants can expect
beneﬁts beyond the spot wage diﬀerence, such as steeper wage
paths at foreign owned establishments ormore favorable overall
labormarket conditions. Our estimates do not necessarily reﬂect
causal relationships, however. The objective of this paper is to
document previously unobserved formal sectormigration ﬂows,
and to relate migration decisions in the formal sector to previ-
ously unobserved employer characteristics.
Our ﬁndings on formal sector migration ﬂows have conceiv-
able implications for poverty alleviation and income inequal-
ity. In the past, import substituting policies reinforced the
geographic clustering of Brazil’s industry and contributed to
income concentration in the South and Southeast regions.
With trade liberalization in the 1990s and the expansion of
infrastructure investments and export promotion programs
in the North, Northeast, and Center-West, production has dis-
persed and regional income inequality has dropped. Mean-
while, interstate worker mobility accelerated. Most notably,
a considerable fraction of formal sector workers moved to-
ward lower income regions during 1997–2001. This is the re-
verse of the ﬂow often posited for informal labor markets in
the ﬂavor of the traditional Harris and Todaro (1970) migra-
tion framework. 1 Our formal sector labor market data show
that moderately and highly skilled workers could expect wage
premia in emerging regions within Brazil during 1997–2001.
While the exact eﬀects of resulting worker ﬂows on the immi-
gration region are beyond the realm of this paper, relatively
skilled migrants who ﬁll vacant positions arguably comple-
ment the local labor force in otherwise unﬁlled occupations
and facilitate the attraction of new industries, which conceiv-
ably contribute to job creation and perhaps a reduction of ur-
ban unemployment. 2Table 1. Regional charac
GDP per capita Population (millions)
North 2,667 1.9
Northeast 2,111 5.4
Southeast 7,507 18.3
South 6,762 8.5
Center-West 7,464 3.0
Average 4,364 6.4
Source: IBGE (1997–2001).The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we summarize the literature on internal migration
and discuss recent policy reforms in Brazil. Section 3 describes
the data, while Section 4 oﬀers descriptive statistics relating
globalization to cross-state migration in Brazil. Section 5 of-
fers multivariate support for the descriptive evidence. We
introduce the statistical model of the migration decision, pay-
ing special attention to the self-selection of migrants and
simultaneous within-state job changes, and present estimation
results alongside. We conclude with some ﬁnal remarks.2. INTERNAL MIGRATION AND POLICY REFORMS
Considerable economic disparities persist between Brazil’s
ﬁve regions. As Table 1 shows, per capitaGDP in the Southern
regions (South and Southeast) is more than triple the per capi-
ta GDP level in the Northern regions (North and Northeast). 3
Even within regions, incomes between Brazil’s 27 states diﬀer.
These regional disparities oﬀer incentives for migration. Bra-
zil’s population in 2001 was approximately 176 million, with
around half (85 million) actively participating in the labor
force. The International Labor Organization estimates that
66% of the labor force held a formal sector job in 1997 (Meier
& Rauch, 2005). Our data cover the formal sector.
(a) Internal migration
Historically, migrants in Brazil moved to cities where import
substituting industries ﬂourished and away from the rural inte-
rior that underwent agricultural modernization (Martine,
1990, chap. 2). Declining agricultural prices contributed to
rural displacement, and migration to the coastal cities accom-
panied Brazil’s industrialization process and urban growth
(Yap, 1976; Graham, 1970). The combination of rising wages
in the industrial South and declining wages in the rural North
accelerated the ﬂight from rural areas over the decades. Using
data from Brazil’s decennial censuses, Martine (1990, chap. 2)
reports that the number of Brazilians residing in a state other
than the state of birth was 3.5 million in 1940 (or 9% of the
population). This share increases steadily until 1980, when
close to 20% of the population reside outside their state of
birth. 4 Migration accelerates further during the last two dec-
ades of the 20th century and results in a doubling of the mi-
grant population share (with the primary residence outside
the birth-state) to 40% by 1999 (Fiess & Verner, 2003).
Research into the determinants of internal migration can be
classiﬁed into two broad categories: research that concentrates
on migrant characteristics, and research that concentrates on
regional characteristics as primary determinants. Early studies
on Brazil, such as Sahota (1968), Graham (1970), and Yap
(1976), relate internal migration to regional and sectoral wage
and income diﬀerences. In a recent study, Fiess and Verner
(2003) place primary attention on migrant and stayer charac-teristics, 1997–2001.
Share of value added in Urbanization
Agric. Manufact. Services
0.106 0.260 0.634 0.004
0.094 0.345 0.561 0.031
0.054 0.416 0.529 0.094
0.139 0.428 0.433 0.130
0.188 0.206 0.606 0.009
0.110 0.322 0.568 0.041
842 WORLD DEVELOPMENTteristics. The authors ﬁnd that migrants from the Northeast to
the Southeast face strong economic incentives for migration,
while migrants from the Southeast region to the Northeast re-
gion are faced with lower estimated returns to migration, sug-
gesting that non-pecuniary factors may play a relatively larger
role for South-to-North migration.
Without detailed information on employer and state level
exposure to international markets, prior research largely ne-
glects the role of market oriented reforms and globalization
for internal migration. This paper aims to shed light on the
relationship between formal sector migration and economic
reform, as promoted through Brazil’s trade, investment, and
macroeconomic policy shifts. We will control for wage diﬀer-
entials and self-selection of migrants, using a 1% random sam-
ple of the national formal workforce, and identify workers’
annual state-to-state migrations during 1997–2001. While
much previous work identiﬁes single migration decisions from
a cross-section of workers, drawing on decennial censuses or
household surveys, the depth of our linked employer–employ-
ee data set allows us to identify worker mobility at the annual
horizon and to incorporate employer level information on
exposure to global markets. Contrary to worker cross-sec-
tions, where worker characteristics are typically only measured
at a single time after migration, we can draw on worker, em-
ployer, and location information before and after the migra-
tion decision. Lacking information on informal workers,
however, our results can only represent migration ﬂows within
the formal sector.
Prior research shows that chief among the migration deter-
minants are migrant characteristics such as age, sex, and edu-
cational attainment, as well as regional characteristics like per
capita income diﬀerentials and urbanization rates. Beyond
those covariates, we include factors related to globalization
at the migrant level—employment in a multinational enter-
prise and employment in an exporting establishment—and
control for state level information on the share of foreign
owned and exporting establishments as factors in the migra-
tion decision. 5
(b) Policy reforms
Brazil oﬀers a particularly interesting setting to study the
association between globalization and domestic formal sector
migration because salient policy reforms occurred with
marked time variation and diﬀerential regional responses.
After Brazil’s democratic transition, it was macroeconomicFigure 1. FDI inﬂows andstabilization and pro-competitive reform, including large scale
trade liberalization and the privatization of utilities, that dom-
inated the national economic policy agenda of the 1990s. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the considerable growth in FDI inﬂows and
exports as a percentage of GDP for the Brazilian economy
during 1995–2001. These notable increases followed macro-
economic stabilization and trade liberalization policies, which
helped bring down inﬂation rates and opened the Brazilian
market to international competition.
Average ad valorem tariﬀ rates fell from 41% to 18% during
1988–89. In the early 1990s, Brazil abolished the remaining
non-tariﬀ barriers inherited from the import substitution
industrialization era (Bittencourt, Larson, & Kraybill, 2008),
brought nominal tariﬀs further down to below 15%, and
formed the free trade area Mercosul with its Southern Cone
neighbors (Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Brazil’s entry
into Mercosul in 1991 contributed to attracting inﬂows of FDI
to the country as a regional export base for multinational
ﬁrms. In addition, gradual FDI liberalizations and the privati-
zation of state owned companies over the 1990s contributed to
attracting capital inﬂows. After decades of high inﬂation and
several unsuccessful stabilization attempts, the Brazilian gov-
ernment succeeded with its macroeconomic stabilization plan
(Plano Real) in 1994 and lastingly ended hyperinﬂation. These
reforms put Brazil’s economy on a pro-competitive basis and
precede our sample period. It is mainly during the second half
of the 1990s that the Brazilian economy exhibits heightened
capital inﬂows and export activity. We hypothesize that Bra-
zil’s progressing integration into the global economy is related
to domestic factor reallocations, which arguably, in turn, af-
fect formal sector migration ﬂows.
Perhaps not surprisingly in a context where macroeconomic
stabilization and pro-competitive reform dominated the na-
tional economic agenda, development policy was increasingly
left to states and municipalities. In fact, even the federal multi-
year development plan (Plano Plurianual) for the years 1996–
99 emphasized the importance of regional clusters of integra-
tion and development and proposed a location speciﬁc eco-
nomic policy agenda to address regional and social
inequalities by targeting existing local economic strengths. Re-
cent theoretical advances in regional economics, with an
emphasis on dynamic agglomeration eﬀects, provided the the-
oretic rationale for the policy shift towards a regional focus
(Amaral-Filho, 2001). The government of Ceara´ (CE) state
is a striking example of the change in development policy.
Ceara´ designed ﬁscal incentives for the relocation of industriesexports, 1995–2001.
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skill intensive services to manufacturing and high value added
services within the state, and to attract companies from other
states (Amaral-Filho, 2003, chap. 16).
More generally, these political eﬀorts and the public interest
in regional development promoted the relocation of industries
towards previously less favored regions in Brazil’s North,
Northeast and Center-West. The regional policies were geared
to attract ﬁrms to so-called arranjos produtivos locais (Lastres,
Cassiolato, & Campos, 2006, chap. 1), or local production and
innovation clusters that beneﬁtted from agglomeration
eﬀects. 6 While the local policies were largely targeted at foster-
ing small and medium sized companies, the relocation of na-
tional ﬁrms’ establishments from one region to another also
played a role in local development strategies. In some cases,
export promotion was an explicit element in the development
programme for a cluster. Even though multinational enter-
prises were not a speciﬁc target, infrastructure investments
and the beneﬁts of agglomeration eﬀects naturally tended to
attract foreign companies alongside.
Using information on foreign ownership and the exporting
status of local establishments, this paper will relate migration
decisions to employer and state level characteristics associated
with globalization. While we will control for additional and
potentially confounding employer and state eﬀects with a rich
set of covariates and ﬁxed eﬀects, our identiﬁcation strategy
does not aim to pinpoint the exact local conditions and poli-
cies that initially attracted foreign owned and exporting estab-
lishments to the potential migration destinations.3. DATA
Our main data source comes from Brazil’s administrative re-
cords of formal sector workers and their employers. We com-
bine this worker information with complementary data
sources on foreign and exporting establishments, industry level
exposure to globalization, and state level characteristics.
(a) Worker data
The linked employer–employee data are from the Brazilian
Labor Ministry (Ministe´rio do Trabalho e Emprego). By law,
all registered establishments are required to report to the min-
istry on their workers every year. In practice, only formally
employed workers will be properly reported. This information
has been collected in the administrative records Relaca˜o Anual
de Informaco˜es Sociais (RAIS) since 1986. For most of our
analysis, we use information from RAIS for the years 1997–
2001 when we also have complementary information. RAIS
includes a unique and time invariant worker identiﬁcation
number PIS (Programa de Integraca˜o) for the private sector,
which coincides with the PASEP (Programa de Formaca˜o do
Patrimoˆnio do Servidor Pu´blico) ID when a worker transitions
into the public sector. Also included in the data are the tax
number of the worker’s establishment (Cadastro Nacional de
Pessoa Jurı´dica, CNPJ), the industrial classiﬁcation of the
worker’s establishment (Classiﬁcaca˜o Nacional de Atividades
Econoˆmicas, CNAE) and the state of the worker’s establish-
ment. 7 RAIS covers establishments in any sector of the econ-
omy, so workers in the services and utilities industries, to
which much of the foreign investments ﬂowed in the second
half of the 1990s, are included.
The main beneﬁt of the RAIS database is the ability to trace
individually identiﬁable workers over time, across establish-
ments, and across states. Brazilian establishment tax numbersare common across many databases so that the information
from RAIS can be linked to complementary establishment le-
vel data sources. The RAIS worker data oﬀer worker informa-
tion on gender, age, educational attainment, 8 and the
worker’s tenure at the establishment in months, as well as
job information including the annual real wage in reais, the
occupational classiﬁcation (Classiﬁcaca˜o Brasileira de Ocu-
paco˜es, CBO), and the type of job separation when recorded.
We draw a 1% random sample of the national data and re-
strict observations as follows. First, only workers with correct
11-digit worker identiﬁcation numbers are included. 9 Follow-
ing Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), we restrict the set
of workers to only those workers receiving positive wages. Fi-
nally, for workers with multiple jobs in a given year, only the
most recent job is included in the sample. If a worker has mul-
tiple current jobs, the highest paying job is included in the
sample. This restriction rests on the assumption that workers
rely on the last and highest paying job of the year in their deci-
sion to migrate.
(b) Complementary establishment, industry, and state data
By law, all foreign investments are registered with Brazil’s
central bank (Banco Central do Brasil (BCB)) in its Registro
Declarato´rio Eletroˆnico–Investimentos Externos Diretos
(RDE–IED). These establishment level data are not publicly
available, but the BCB made available portions of the
RDE–IED for the years 1996–2001 10 for our research, includ-
ing information on both ﬂows and stocks of foreign invest-
ment. Our data include: ﬁrst, a list of all establishments
(CNPJ tax numbers) with a positive inﬂow of FDI for the
years 1996–2001; and second, a list of all establishments
(CNPJ tax numbers) with a positive stock of foreign capital
in the year 2001. Although we lack direct information on an
establishment’s FDI stock by year, these data allow for a pro-
cedure to infer with considerable conﬁdence which establish-
ments are at least partially foreign owned in a given year
during 1996–2001.
We deﬁne an establishment to be at least partly foreign
owned in year t if the establishment received an inﬂow of for-
eign capital in year t. We note that establishments receiving in-
ﬂows of foreign capital in year t may maintain a stock of
foreign capital in later years. Therefore, establishments with
a positive stock of foreign capital in 2001 are classiﬁed as for-
eign owned in all years sP t after the initially observed inﬂow
at year t, even if no inﬂow is observed in the intervening years.
If we observe no FDI inﬂow to an establishment but an FDI
stock in 2001, we consider the establishment foreign owned for
the entire sample period. Conversely, if we observe no foreign
ownership by 2001, we assign the year with the last FDI inﬂow
as the ﬁnal year of foreign ownership. 11 Our main concern are
establishments without any recorded inﬂows of foreign invest-
ment and no stock of foreign capital in 2001. By our deﬁni-
tion, these are considered domestically owned enterprises.
So, we may miss foreign owned establishments if there was
an initial inﬂow of foreign capital before our sample period
and a full divestiture at some point during the sample period.
Note, however, that retained earnings are inﬂows under com-
mon FDI deﬁnitions so that inﬂows are likely to be observed
in every year of foreign ownership. Nevertheless, missing some
(partly) foreign owned establishments moves the odds of
detecting a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of foreign ownership
against us and potentially weakens our later results.
We consider partial foreign ownership of a holding com-
pany to aﬀect all establishments of the corporate group. Using
BCB information on the corporate ownership relations among
844 WORLD DEVELOPMENTBrazilian ﬁrms, we count an establishment as at least partly
foreign owned in year t if it is a subsidiary of a foreign owned
enterprise. Matching the RDE–IED information to the RAIS
data at the establishment level, we deﬁne an indicator variable
equal to one if a worker holds a job at a foreign owned estab-
lishment. We also compute the share of foreign owned estab-
lishments at the state level.
We use exporter status data from the Brazilian customs oﬃce
Secretaria de Come´rcio Exterior (SECEX). SECEX records all
legally registered establishments in Brazil with at least one ex-
port transaction in a given year. This is our deﬁnition of an
exporting establishment. We match the SECEX information
from 1997 to 2001 to our RDE–IED and RAIS data and deﬁne
an indicator variable equal to one if a worker holds a job at an
establishment with a positive dollar value of free-on-board ex-
ports in a given year. We also compute the share of exporting
establishments at the state level. 12
Figure 2 shows average shares of foreign owned establish-
ments and of exporting establishments by state during 1997–
2001, with darker shades reﬂecting higher shares. Amazonas
(AM), in the North, has the highest share of foreign invest-
ments, as deﬁned by the share of foreign owned establishments
in the state during the ﬁve year period from 1997 to 2001. This
reﬂects Brazil’s export promotion programs for the Amazon
and export processing zones around the capital city Manaus.
Sa˜o Paulo (SP) and Rio de Janeiro (RJ) states rank second
and third, respectively. The Northeastern states of Tocantins
(TO), Sergipe (SE), and Acre (AC) are the locations with the
smallest shares of foreign ownership.Amazonas state also ranks
the highest in terms of exporting establishments to total estab-
lishments. Para´ (PA) state, also in the North, has the second
highest share of exporting establishments. Otherwise, exporting
establishments are largely concentrated in the Southern regions.
In order to reﬂect a Brazilian industry’s lagged exposure to
global competition, we obtain export and import information
from the World Trade Flow (WTF) database (Feenstra, Lip-
sey, Deng, Ma, & Mo, 2005) for the years 1996–2000. We ex-
tract sector level trade ﬂow statistics by SITC (Rev. 2) 4-digit
product category in current US$ for Brazil’s exports and im-
ports, and map the trade ﬂow information to the 2-digit
CNAE sector level in RAIS (broadly comparable to the SITC
2-digit level). We then use a state’s industrial composition
from RAIS to calculate last period’s location speciﬁc exposure
to foreign trade.Figure 2. Global integration ofWe obtain state level information on population, GDP per
capita, urbanization rates, and value added in agriculture,
manufacturing, and services from the Brazilian Census Bureau
Instituto Brasileiro de Geograﬁa e Estatı´stica (IBGE; see Ta-
ble 1). These variables are traditionally reported among the
key determinants of the migration decision.4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The complete linked employer–employee database includes
the full employment history of formal sector workers in Brazil
from 1997 to 2001.
(a) Migrant and stayer characteristics
We deﬁne workers as migrants if the state of the worker’s
establishment at time t is diﬀerent from the state of the work-
er’s establishment at time t þ 1. Conversely, if a worker re-
mains in the same state for years t and t þ 1, he is
considered a stayer, but may change jobs, that is switch
employers, within the same state.
The ﬁnal 1% random sample includes 480,729 workers in
339,515 establishments over the period 1997–2001 (for
1,548,131 total observations). We use the 366,206 individuals
(approximately three-quarters of the formal sector labor force)
who appear in the data for at least two consecutive time peri-
ods to calculate annual migration statistics. 13 Workers who
cannot be traced over time include workers who die or retire
and workers who exit the formal sector to informal employ-
ment, to self-employment or to unemployment, and workers
who choose to leave the labor force. 14 While our data on for-
mal sector workers may miss these transitions into the infor-
mal sector and unemployment, using cross-sectional
household surveys to study migration patterns has its own
shortcomings. Household data potentially exaggerate unem-
ployment rates because formal sector migrants are classiﬁed
as missing and removed from both the numerator and
denominator of the unemployment rate. Our paper documents
formal sector migration by tracing individual workers over
time and across states, and as such, this paper complements
current migration studies using household surveys.
The workers are from any of the 27 Brazilian states and any
sector of the economy. Migrants represent around 2% of theBrazilian states, 1997–2001.
Figure 3. Tenure wage proﬁles, by establishment type, 1997–2001.
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of our longitudinal data over traditional household surveys
is the ability to trace workers with multiple migration epi-
sodes. Of the 17,568 migrants in the sample, approximately
one-quarter are repeat migrants. Our data contain 3,996 work-
ers with two migration episodes, 530 workers with three
migration episodes, and 65 workers with four migration epi-
sodes. 15
Formal sector migrants are most often from the Center-
West and Northern regions, where 3.9% and 3.0% of workers
are migrants, respectively, while workers from the Southeast-
ern region are least likely to move between states (2.0% of
workers migrate). As a consequence of annual migration rates
around 2% on average, small diﬀerences in employment pat-
terns may have a potentially strong impact on migration pat-
terns.
Small annual migration rates can nevertheless be associated
with considerable migration backgrounds in a cross-section of
households and workers. Suppose a worker’s migration odds
are independent of past migration and that a worker migrates
with equal probability in any year during his 40 years of labor
force experience. Then an annual migration rate of 2% among
formal sector workers will result in a share of 55% of workers
with a migration background among the cohort just beforeTable 2. Average worker cha
Full sam
Worker chara
Primary school 0.56
High school 0.30
Some college 0.03
College graduate 0.10
Female 0.37
Time variant cha
Age in year t 34.0
Log average wages in t 8.08
Log average wages in t þ 1 8.14
Employed at foreign establ. in year t 0.02
Employed at foreign establ. in year t þ 1 0.02
Employed at exporting establ. in year t 0.08
Employed at exporting establ. in year t þ 1 0.08
Number of observations 1,005,
Note: Worker characteristics in the upper panel are largely time invariant exc
formal sector labor force.
Sources: RAIS (1% random sample), RDE–IED, and SECEX (1997–2001).retirement (1 :9840), and a 33% migration background for
a worker half-way through the active time in the labor force
(1 :9820). Little is known about the odds of repeat migration,
and little is known about annual migration rates among work-
ers outside the formal sector. Yet the notable share of Brazil’s
population with a cross-state migration background—around
40% by the late 1990s (Fiess & Verner, 2003)—suggests that
the annual formal sector migration rate of around 2% is per-
haps similar to overall migration rates.
Table 2 contrasts average worker characteristics of migrants
and stayers during 1997–2001. Though migrants and stayers in
our formal sector sample are remarkably similar, there are a
few key diﬀerences. Formal sector migrants are less likely to
have a high school degree and more likely to have only a
primary school education than stayers. Meanwhile, migrants
are equally likely to have at least some college education as
non-migrants. This highlights an important diﬀerence between
our data on formal sector migration and conventional statis-
tics on rural-to-urban migration in developing countries. For-
mal sector migration is relatively higher skilled migration.
Over 6% of formal sector workers with at least some college
education migrate across state lines at least once during the
sample period. In contrast, just 2.4% of formal sector workers
with a high school degree migrated during the ﬁve year periodracteristics, 1997–2001.
ple Migrants Stayers
cteristics
3 0.587 0.563
3 0.280 0.304
3 0.039 0.033
1 0.094 0.101
2 0.210 0.376
racteristics
31.5 34.1
8.18 8.08
8.19 8.13
2 0.039 0.022
8 0.052 0.027
5 0.081 0.085
6 0.080 0.086
010 22,837 982,173
ept for infrequent advances in educational attainment after entry into the
846 WORLD DEVELOPMENTand 2.8% of workers with only a primary school education are
migrants.
This pattern exhibits only some regional variation across
emigrant region. In all regions except for the South, workers
with at least some college education are more likely than
workers with lower levels of education to migrate; only in
the South are workers with at least some college and workers
with a primary or high school education equally likely to mi-
grate. Formal sector migrants of all education levels are most
likely to migrate from the Center-West region, consistent with
the high total emigration from this state. At the state level
within regions, there is some variability. Workers with only
a primary school education, for instance, are more likely than
the highest skilled workers to migrate out of the Northern
states of Roraima (RR) and Tocantins, the Northeastern
states of Alagoas (AL), Bahia (BA), Sergipe, Maranha˜o
(MA), Rio Grande do Norte (RN), and the Center-West state
of Mato Grosso (MT). Workers of all education levels are
about equally likely to leave Sa˜o Paulo state.
Migrant demographics vary across immigrant states.
Migrating workers who arrive in the Southeast and the Distri-
to Federal (DF) around Brazil’s capital are more likely to be
high skilled. In contrast, formal sector migrants to the North
are more likely to have only a primary school education. The
main exception is Amazonas state. Our data indicate that the
share of high skilled formal sector migrants to Amazonas state
is greater than the share of low skilled formal sector migrants.
These high skilled migrants most frequently move from within
the Northern region.
Women are less likely to be formal sector migrants. This
observation is consistent across all states and regions. The
rates of migration for men and women are most similar in
the Southern region. The average migrant is approximately
two years younger than the average stayer. Youth aged 15–
17 are least likely to migrate, while young workers (18–24
years) are most likely to migrate.
Wages for formal sector migrants, both before and after the
migration decision, are higher than wages for stayers. Before
the migration decision, the average migrant earns average an-
nual wages approximately 10% higher than stayers. The wage
diﬀerential falls to 6% after the migration decision. Migration
theory based on neoclassical human capital theory posits that
workers search for jobs that oﬀer the highest economic return
in expected future wages. If the expected wage diﬀerential is a
main determinant of the migration decision, the drop in the
wage diﬀerential suggests that expectedly steeper or more cer-Table 3. Job retentions an
National
1997 1999
Job retention
Same location 0.606 0.526
Transfer 0.004 0.003
Job changes (frequencies conditional on no retention)
Same state 0.255 0.176
Migrate metro 0.051 0.042
Migrate other 0.075 0.063
Other changes (frequencies conditional on no retention)
Retire 0.040 0.060
Formal exit 0.569 0.653
Notes: End-years of annual worker continuations and transitions between job
ﬁrms. Retirements include reported deaths on the job. Formal sector exits are
labor force.
Sources: RAIS (1% random sample, 1996–2001).tain future wage paths could be important factors for the
migration decision beyond the spot wage diﬀerential.
(b) Job changes and migration
Nationwide, between 40% and half of all formal sector work-
ers change jobs per year, as Table 3 shows. In metropolitan
areas, however, turnover is considerably smaller than the
nationwide average, with only around one in four metropolitan
workers changing jobs. Transfers of workers within ﬁrms but
across states are only a minor component of formal sector
migration. Migration is a remarkably important choice for
workers with formal sector job changes (who neither retire
nor exit the formal sector). Nationwide, roughly two-thirds
of the job changing workers switch employment within-state
(the proportion of the same state job changers in all job chang-
ers), but one-third migrate across state borders. 16 Close to one-
half of all cross-border job changers move to a metropolitan
area. Two to three in ﬁve workers with a job loss exit the formal
sector at the annual horizon. 17 The focus of the present paper
lies on migrants with a successful formal sector reallocation.
Table 4 traces the 206,418 workers (about 20% of our sam-
ple) who changed jobs over a year between types of establish-
ments—domestic or foreign owned establishments and non-
exporting or exporting establishments—and oﬀers a more
manifest indication that globalization may be related to inter-
nal migration. The overall odds for a worker at a domestic
establishment to change to a multinational enterprise (0.026/
0.954 = 0.027) are almost ten times smaller than for a multi-
national worker to change to another foreign owned establish-
ment (0.004/0.016 = 0.250). 18 Similarly, the odds for a worker
at a non-exporting establishment to change to an exporter
(0.047/0.874 = 0.054) are almost ten times smaller than for a
worker at an exporter to change to another exporter (0.026/
0.053 = 0.491).
As a consequence, the bulk of workers move between
domestic and non-exporting establishments. But there are
notable diﬀerences between migrants and stayers in their expo-
sure to foreign owned and exporting establishments. Since
migration frequencies are small at the annual horizon, appar-
ently minor diﬀerences can matter for migration outcomes. Of
the 206,418 workers with a job change in our sample, 20,684
(10%) migrate across states. 19 And of these 20,684 migrants,
733 (3.5%) switch into a foreign owned establishment from a
domestic establishment with their cross-state move; 1,027
(5.0%) of the migrants switch into an exporting establishmentd changes, 1997–2001.
Metropolitan areas
2001 1997 1999 2001
0.484 0.728 0.730 0.756
0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005
0.148 0.468 0.428 0.514
0.055 0.014 0.014 0.019
0.087 0.020 0.023 0.025
0.071 0.035 0.038 0.041
0.633 0.447 0.480 0.381
s. Transfers are changes of establishment across state borders but within
to informal employment, unemployment, self-employment, or out of the
Table 4. Establishment types and migration, 1997–2001.
Full sample Migrants Stayers
Number Share Number Share Number Share
Workers with job change, switching establishment types
Domestic to foreign owned 5,422 0.026 733 0.035 4,709 0.025
Foreign owned to domestic 3,256 0.016 492 0.024 2,764 0.015
Non-exporting to exporting 9,759 0.047 1,027 0.050 8,732 0.047
Exporting to non-exporting 11,024 0.053 1,082 0.052 9,942 0.054
Workers with job change, remaining in establishment types
Domestic establishments 196,922 0.954 19,381 0.937 177,541 0.956
Foreign owned establishments 798 0.004 78 0.004 720 0.004
Non-exporting establishments 180,360 0.874 18,243 0.882 162,117 0.873
Exporting establishments 5,275 0.026 332 0.016 4,943 0.027
Number of observations 206,418 20,684 185,734
Note: Sample restricted to workers who change establishments over a year.
Sources: RAIS (1% random sample), RDE–IED, and SECEX (1997–2001).
GLOBALIZATION AND FORMAL SECTOR MIGRATION IN BRAZIL 847from a non-exporting establishment after migration. Migrants
are more likely to move to a job at a foreign owned or export-
ing establishment than the average worker: for non-migrants
with a job change, the transition frequencies to a foreign
owned or exporting establishment are only 2.5% and 4.7%,
respectively. Workers with a job change from an exporter to
another exporter are more likely to be non-migrants (2.7%)
than migrants (1.6%), however, possibly because exporters
are regionally clustered.
We further restrict the sample in Table 5 to the 20,684 job
changing migrants (as in the middle panel of Table 4) to
decompose migrant transitions between relatively rich and
poor states. 20 A common assertion for Brazil is that migrants
leave the relatively poor states in the North and Northeastern
regions to relocate to the relatively rich states in the South and
Southeast. While poor-to-rich migrations account for about
20% of our sample (4,352 workers), migrations from rich
states to poor states make up roughly the same share (4,081
workers) as select states in the North and Northeast receive
large ﬂows of migrants.
This paper provides evidence for a possible explanation of
this reverse migration – globalization in the form of new for-
eign owned and exporting establishments, particularly in the
Northern states of Amazonas and Para´, which have beneﬁted
from governmental export promotion programs and export
processing zones. In line with this hypothesis, a worker from
a relatively rich state who migrates to a relatively poor state
is more likely to move from a non-exporting establishmentTable 5. Establishment types and m
Rich–Rich Poo
Number Share Number
Workers with job change, switching establishment types
Domestic to foreign owned 474 0.050 43
Foreign owned to domestic 262 0.027 27
Non-exporting to exporting 558 0.058 44
Exporting to non-exporting 545 0.057 110
Workers with job change, remaining in establishment types
Domestic establishments 8,778 0.918 2,616
Foreign owned establishments 50 0.005 1
Non-exporting establishments 8,255 0.863 2,437
Exporting establishments 206 0.022 44
Number of observations 9,564 2,687
Note: Sample restricted to workers who migrate and change establishments ov
Sources: RAIS (1% random sample), RDE–IED, and SECEX (1997–2001).to an exporting establishment than is a poor-to-rich migrant
(4.9% of poor-to-rich migrants as compared to 4.0% of rich-
to-poor migrants). Of course, industrial promotion programs
may additionally contribute to these reverse migration pat-
terns. Fiscal incentives in the Northeastern state of Ceara´
are an example. However, state-to-state migration patterns
suggest that Ceara´ receives relatively few immigrants (also
see Figure 4).
(c) Employer characteristics
Table 6 shows that workers in foreign owned establishments
are more educated on average than workers in their domestic
establishment counterparts. Almost 20% of workers at a for-
eign owned establishment are college graduates, while only
10% of workers at domestic establishments have a college de-
gree. Workers at foreign owned establishments are on average
one-half year younger and less likely to be female than work-
ers at domestic establishments. Workers in exporting estab-
lishments are also younger and more likely male than
workers in non-exporting establishments. However, workers
in exporting establishments are on average less educated.
58% of exporting establishment workers have only a primary
school education.
Wage diﬀerentials between current employment and ex-
pected future employment are a widely documented determi-
nant of migration. Exporters and foreign owned
establishments typically pay higher wages, partly because ofigration transitions, 1997–2001.
Migrants: of which transition is
r– Poor Poor–Rich Rich–Poor
Share Number Share Number Share
0.016 155 0.036 61 0.015
0.010 76 0.017 127 0.031
0.016 174 0.040 199 0.049
0.041 222 0.051 205 0.050
0.974 4,101 0.942 3,886 0.952
0.0003 20 0.005 7 0.002
0.907 3,917 0.900 3,634 0.890
0.016 39 0.009 43 0.011
4,352 4,081
er a year.
Figure 4. Emigration and immigration frequencies by state, 1997–2001.
Table 6. Average workforce characteristics, by establishment type, 1997–2001.
Full sample Foreign Domestic Exporting Non-exporting
Primary school 0.563 0.362 0.568 0.577 0.562
High school 0.303 0.363 0.302 0.303 0.303
Some college 0.033 0.083 0.032 0.040 0.032
College graduate 0.101 0.193 0.099 0.081 0.103
Female 0.372 0.259 0.375 0.243 0.384
Age 34.0 33.5 34.0 32.7 34.1
Number of observations 1,005,010 22,071 982,939 85,677 919,333
Sources: RAIS (1% random sample), RDE–IED, and SECEX (1997–2001).
848 WORLD DEVELOPMENTmore skilled workforces (see Table 6) and partly because of
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in compensation (Menezes-Filho, Muendler,
& Ramey, 2008). Beyond diﬀerences in spot wages, expected
wage proﬁles provide incentives for job changes and migra-
tion. In Figure 3, we graph the average log wage for workers
over years of tenure at the establishment, by establishment
type. The tenure wage proﬁle for foreign owned establish-
ments is considerably steeper than the tenure wage proﬁle
for domestic owned establishments, while there appears to
be only a small diﬀerence between the tenure wage paths for
exporting and non-exporting establishments. In fact, based
on evidence from linear prediction, an additional year of ten-
ure at a non-exporting establishment is associated with 2.1%
higher wages, while an additional year at an exporting estab-
lishment relates to 2.9% higher wages. Meanwhile, an addi-
tional year of tenure at a multinational enterprise predicts a
wage increase by more than double the amount at a domestic
owned establishment (4.5% as compared to 2.1%).
(d) Emigrant and immigrant states
Figure 4 maps the frequency of formal sector emigration
and immigration by state. Formal sector emigrants are most
likely to come from the Northern regions. More than one in
twenty workers from Tocantins in the sample migrated to an-
other state during 1997–2001. Over 3% of workers in Sergipe,
Rondoˆnia (RO), Roraima, and Amapa´ (AP) leave for another
state. The share of emigrants in the Center-West region is sim-
ilarly high. Close to 5% of workers from Mato Grosso and the
Distrito Federal are migrants. Emigrants are least likely to
come from states in the South and Southeast. Only 1.5%and 1.7% of workers in Rio Grande do Sul (RS) and Sa˜o Pau-
lo, respectively, migrate to another state.
Immigration to the Southeast dominates. Over 15% of the
sample workforce head to Sa˜o Paulo state, while 6.2% and
5.8% move to Minas Gerais (MG) and Rio de Janeiro states,
respectively. The states of Goia´s and the Distrito Federal in
the Center-West, Para´ in the North, and Bahia in the North-
east, however, also receive considerable ﬂows of immigrants.
This stands in stark contrast to the common assertion that
the typical migrant ﬂow in Brazil runs from North to South,
or from relatively poor regions to relatively rich regions.
Although a large part of formal sector migration in Brazil is
regional, there is substantial migration from great distances. 21
Emigrants from Acre in the North are most likely to move
across the country to Alagoas state in the Northeast and
immigrants in Espı´rito Santo (ES) in the Southeast are most
frequently from Alagoas. Not surprisingly, 14 out of 27 states
send the highest shares of migrants to Sa˜o Paulo. Meanwhile,
among emigrants from Sa˜o Paulo state during 1997–2001, al-
most 70% moved within the South or Southeast, yet almost
21% migrated to states in the Northern regions, and 13% mi-
grated to the Center-West region. Immigrants to Amazonas
state are most likely to arrive from within the Northern region,
while close to 3% of formal sector migrants moving to Amazo-
nas state arrive from the South and Southeast regions.5. ESTIMATION OF THE MIGRATION DECISION
We now turn tomultivariate analysis for more systematic evi-
dence on the relationship between formal sector migration and
GLOBALIZATION AND FORMAL SECTOR MIGRATION IN BRAZIL 849Brazil’s increasing integration into the global economy. The ap-
proach allows us to simultaneously condition on multiple
covariates associated with formal sector migration ﬂows, and
to discern their importance as predictors for migration. We ﬁrst
treat the self-selection problem inherent in the migration deci-
sion and estimate a maximum likelihood model of selectivity
corrected wages (Heckman, 1979). On the basis of these pre-
dicted wages, we follow the Dahl (2002) methodology and ac-
count for a migrant’s choice between multiple destinations.
(a) An econometric model of migration with self-selection
The neoclassical migration model takes expected utility dif-
ferentials as the underlying forces for migration. Rational
individuals optimize expected lifetime utility, given the ex-
pected earnings diﬀerential and costs to migrate. Non-pecuni-
ary factors such as diﬀerences in regional amenities or land
values may also enter the utility function and inﬂuence the
migration decision. Econometric studies analyzing migration
decisions typically depart from a Mincer (1974) wage regres-
sion as follows
Y i ¼ aX i þ bMi þ dZs þ i; ð1Þ
where Y i are log wages for individual i, X i is a vector of indi-
vidual characteristics, Mi is a binary variable equal to one if
the worker migrates, Zs is a vector of characteristics for state
s, and i is the error term.
Estimation of the return to migration based on a compari-
son of wages as in Eqn. (1) between migrants and stayers
may be biased due to self-selection. A correctly speciﬁed b
could only be recovered directly if we observed a worker once
randomly induced to migrate and once to stay. Simplifying
Eqn. (1), b measures the expected diﬀerence in wage outcomes
for a worker, conditional on migration, that is
EðbjX ; Z;M ¼ 1Þ ¼ EðY mjX ; Z;M ¼ 1Þ  EðY sjX ; Z;M ¼ 1Þ;
where EðjX ; Z;M ¼ 1Þ is the conditional expectation function
(conditional on migration and a vector of covariates), and Y m
and Y s are wage outcomes for a migrant and a stayer. The re-
searcher knows the ﬁrst element of the term, but it is impossible
to observe the second part of the term—wages of a stayer con-
ditional on the counterfactual circumstance that he migrates.
Consider the following decomposition of observed outcome
variables: wages of migrants conditional on migration and
wages of stayers conditional on staying,
EðY mjX ; Z;M ¼ 1Þ  EðY sjX ; Z;M ¼ 1Þ þ EðY sjX ; Z;M ¼ 1Þ
 EðY sjX ; Z;M ¼ 0Þ:
The ﬁrst two terms of the expression represent the parameter
of interest b, while the last two terms represent the self-selec-
tion bias—the diﬀerence in counterfactual outcomes depend-
ing on whether a worker migrates or stays. Self-selection
may occur if migrants are selected by employers in the immi-
gration state on the basis of worker characteristics or if mi-
grants sort themselves into regions and occupations with the
highest expected relative earnings.
Our estimation procedure derives from the Roy (1951) mod-
el of self-selection as extended by Dahl (2002). The approach
allows the migration decision and the economic returns from
migration to be determined simultaneously.
Consider the migration decision. An individual chooses to
migrate depending on the gains and costs of migration.
Neglecting other regional attributes for a moment, an individ-
ual will migrate if the expected wage diﬀerential from migrat-
ing exceeds the associated costsY mi  Y si > Ci;
where Y mi and Y si are wages in the migration state and wages
in the home state, respectively, and Ci are the associated mov-
ing costs. Following the literature, we suppose that a worker’s
propensity to migrate is a linear function of the wage diﬀeren-
tial as well as individual, X i, and state, Zs, characteristics
Mi ¼ a0 þ a1½Y mi  Y si þ a2X i þ a3Zs þ i; ð2Þ
where Mi is the migration indicator.
As discussed, the econometrician cannot observe wage out-
comes for an individual in both the migrant state (Y mi) and the
stayer state (Y si). To overcome the self-selection problem, we
ﬁrst estimate the observed wage as the outcome of a mi-
grate-or-stay decision, using maximum likelihood for the
selection correction (Heckman, 1979). 22 Our baseline estima-
tion is as follows. The migration selection equation includes
worker and state characteristics. The wage outcome equation
excludes state level characteristics under the assumption that
worker and employer characteristics exhaustively predict earn-
ings. The Dahl (2002) approach then estimates the migration
decision as predicted by selectivity corrected wage diﬀerentials,
worker and state characteristics. In addition to conventional
regressors, our data also allow us to include employer charac-
teristics in the migration regression. In a robustness check be-
yond the standard Dahl (2002) approach, we ultimately also
account for workers who change jobs within-state and whose
presence in the non-migrant group might aﬀect the estimates.
For now, we turn to the baseline estimates.
(b) Selectivity corrected wage outcomes
Table 7 presents the results from a selectivity corrected wage
outcome estimation using maximum likelihood. Column (1)
reports selectivity corrected coeﬃcients for our baseline speci-
ﬁcation. All regressors in the outcome (wage) equation are
highly signiﬁcant and exhibit the expected sign. 23 Worker spe-
ciﬁc variables in the migration equation are highly signiﬁcant
and corroborate the evidence from Section 4: women are less
likely to migrate than men; workers with at least some college
are more likely to migrate than less educated workers; migra-
tion is decreasing in age. State level information is also largely
consistent with the literature: the higher is the state’s urbaniza-
tion rate, log state average wages, and the state’s log value
added in agriculture and manufacturing, the less likely is a
worker to migrate. Interestingly, GDP per capita at t corre-
lates signiﬁcantly positively with migration. A formal sector
worker is more likely to migrate if he resides in a high-
income state, in contrast to common priors. 24 The sign is also
consistent with the economic rationale that skilled formal sec-
tor emigrants from high income states may expect to ﬁnd for-
mal sector jobs with steeper or more certain wage paths at
employers in lower income states. Column (2) includes state le-
vel dummies as controls.
We augment our baseline speciﬁcation to include employer
level controls both before and after the migration decision.
Identiﬁcation of the selectivity corrected coeﬃcients in column
(2) derives from the excluded state level sectoral compositions
in the outcome equation. After including employer level infor-
mation, these state level characteristics arguably matter little
for wage determination, but are still important factors for
migration. Column (3) presents results with employer controls
after the migration decision in the outcome equation, and the
speciﬁcation in column (4) also includes establishment con-
trols before the migration decision in the outcome equation.
Establishment controls include average log wages, the log
number of workers, the share of female workers, and the share
Table 7. Selectivity corrected wage estimation.
Dependent variable:
log wage in t þ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome equation: Log Wage
Female 0.408** 0.417** 0.250** 0.192**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016)
High school graduate 0.463** 0.445** 0.223** 0.223**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Some college 1.183** 1.152** 0.592** 0.527**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022)
College graduate 1.640** 1.610** 0.932** 0.894**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Age at t þ 1 0.065** 0.066** 0.033** 0.027**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Age at t þ 1 squared 0.001** 0.001** 0.0003** 0.0002**
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Selection equation: Migrate
Female 0.337** 0.337** 0.335** 0.334**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
High school graduate 0.017* 0.017* 0.011 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Some college 0.132** 0.132** 0.142** 0.152**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
College graduate 0.087** 0.087** 0.095** 0.107**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age at t 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Urbanization at t 0.131** 0.131** 0.134** 0.136**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
GDP per capita at t 0.076** 0.076** 0.078** 0.077**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log average state
wages at t
0.209** 0.209** 0.209** 0.202**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Log value added in
agriculture at t
0.010** 0.010** 0.012** 0.013**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log value added in
manufacturing at t
0.097** 0.097** 0.095** 0.092**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log value added in
services at t
0.050** 0.050** 0.049** 0.046**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Fixed eﬀects: state at
t þ 1
Yes Yes Yes
Establishment controls
at t þ 1
Yes Yes
Establishment controls
at t
Yes
Number of
observations
1,005,010 1,005,010 1,004,549 1,003,876
Notes: Establishment controls include average wages, number of workers,
the share of female workers, and the share of workers in eight age groups,
four education groups, and ﬁve occupational groups. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
Sources: RAIS (1% random sample) and IBGE (1997–2001).
* Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
850 WORLD DEVELOPMENTof workers in eight age groups, four education groups, and ﬁve
occupational groups. 25
In our preferred speciﬁcation with employer controls before
and after the migration decision (column 4), all regressors inthe wage equation are still highly signiﬁcant and exhibit the ex-
pected signs. After inclusion of employer level information,
the bias corrected coeﬃcients on the individual characteristics
move towards zero as expected, but coeﬃcients in the selection
equation show negligible changes. The coeﬃcients on employ-
er level controls in the outcome equation, not reported in Ta-
ble 7, have expected signs—employment at an establishment
with higher average wages both before and after migration is
positively correlated with a worker’s wages.
(c) Globalization and formal sector migration
We predict selectivity corrected wages for workers in all 27
Brazilian states as migrants and stayers with the coeﬃcient
estimates from column (4) of Table 7. We then follow Dahl
(2002) and extend the Roy (1951) model to the multiple desti-
nation migration decision by grouping workers with similar
characteristics into worker cells. We deﬁne cells by emigration
state, year, age, 26 gender, and education. 27 We then stack
observations for each emigration state-immigration state pair
to generate a matrix of migration probabilities calculated for
each state s as the fraction of workers in the cell who migrate
from state s to state m in year t. The transformed data set in-
cludes 135,044 cells with an average of 187 workers per cell. 28
We then adapt Eqn. (2) to include Mcsm, the probability that
a worker from cell cmigrates from state s to statem, as follows:
Mcsm ¼ a0 þ a1½bY cm  bY cs þ a2Xc þ a3Zs þ cms; ð3Þ
where c denotes the 135,044 cell observations, bY cm and bY cs are
computed as the cell average of the bias corrected predicted
wages from the Heckman (1979) selectivity correction for mi-
grants and stayers, Xc includes cell characteristics (gender, age,
and educational attainment), and Zs includes state level char-
acteristics.
To study the relationship between formal sector migration
and market oriented policy reforms in Brazil, our main speci-
ﬁcation augments Eqn. (3) so that Xc includes cell average em-
ployer characteristics. For instance, our analysis relates the
following predictors to cell c’s probability of migration: the
share of workers in cell c employed at a foreign owned estab-
lishment, the share of workers in cell c employed at an export-
ing establishment, and the cell average establishment level
tenure wage proﬁle. We measure the tenure wage proﬁle as
the gradient between establishment average wages for workers
with less than a year of tenure and establishment average
wages for workers with 30 years of tenure (see Figure 3). We
also augment the vector Zs to include state level globalization
related characteristics, such as the state share of foreign owned
establishments, the state share of exporting establishments,
state level log of exports, and state level log of imports, as
additional regressors. The latter exports and imports regres-
sors serve as controls for a location’s exposure to global com-
petition and as such are not reported.
Table 8 reports results from the ordinary least squares esti-
mation of Eqn. (3). We regress worker cell migration probabil-
ities on cell characteristics and state characteristics, pooling the
migration probabilities of all cells from all states s to all states
m. All regressions are weighted by the number of workers in
each cell, standard errors are clustered at the emigration state
level to account for spatial correlation of errors, and annual
time dummies are included to control for economy wide shocks
aﬀecting all workers (e.g., the Brazilian currency crisis in 1999).
Column (1) reports estimation results for a simple model in
which the interstate wage diﬀerential and worker characteris-
tics predict the migration decision. The result, after controlling
for worker characteristics like gender, age, and educational
GLOBALIZATION AND FORMAL SECTOR MIGRATION IN BRAZIL 851attainment, and using selectivity corrected wage diﬀerentials,
suggests that interstate wage diﬀerentials are positively corre-
lated with a worker’s decision to migrate. A 1% increase in
the spot wage diﬀerential is associated with a 0.2% increase
in the probability of cross-state migration. The remaining cell
speciﬁc variables are highly signiﬁcant and corroborate the
evidence from Section 4: women are less likely to migrate than
men, while the probability of migration is increasing in the le-
vel of education and decreasing in age. In column (2), we add
emigration state ﬁxed eﬀects, emigration state time varying
controls, and emigration establishment controls, including
the cell average establishment level 30-year tenure wage
proﬁle. The expectation of higher future wages in the current
establishment signiﬁcantly reduces the likelihood of migration,
and the interstate wage diﬀerential remains signiﬁcantly posi-
tively correlated with the migration frequency.Table 8. Formal sector
Dependent variable: Migration prob. (1) (
Job characteristics
Predicted wage diﬀ. ðbY cm  bY csÞ 0.002** 0.0
(0.0003) (0.0
Worker characteristics
Tenure wage proﬁle in t 0.
(0.0
Tenure wage proﬁle in t þ 1
Empl. at foreign establ. in t
Empl. at foreign establ. in t þ 1
Empl. at exporting establ. in t
Empl. at exporting establ. in t þ 1
State characteristics related to globalization
Share of foreign establ. in t
Share of foreign establ. in t þ 1
Share of exporting establ. in t
Share of exporting establ. in t þ 1
Worker controls Yes Y
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Y
Emigration establ. controls Y
Emigration state ﬁxed eﬀects Y
Emigration state controls Y
Immigration establ. controls
Immigration state controls
Number of observations 135,044 103
Notes: Worker cells are formed by eight age, two gender, and four educational
per capita, average state wages, value added from agriculture, services, and ma
wages, number of workers, the share of female workers, and the share of worker
Regressions are weighted by cell size. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
Sources: RAIS (1% random sample), IBGE, RDE–IED, and SECEX (1997–2
* Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.Speciﬁcation (3) introduces employer characteristics related
to globalization, including the share of the cell employed in a
foreign owned establishment and the share of the cell employed
in an exporting establishment. Employment at a multinational
ﬁrm is not statistically signiﬁcantly associated with migration.
But results suggest that employment at an exporting establish-
ment is negatively related to internal migration. A one stan-
dard deviation increase in the share of the cell employed at
exporting establishments (approximately 10%) is associated
with a 3% decrease in the probability of migration. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the idea that the business success of exporting
establishments informs workers’ migration decisions.
Including state level controls related to globalization in col-
umn (4) oﬀers similar conclusions. The share of the cell em-
ployed at an exporting establishment remains negatively
correlated with the probability of migration. Controlling formigration in Brazil.
2) (3) (4) (5)
02* 0.002* 0.002* 0.00001
01) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005)
004* 0.004 0.004 0.004
02) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
0.0006
(0.005)
0.0004 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.003
(0.002)
0.003** 0.003** 0.001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.013 0.004
(0.038) (0.040)
0.181*
(0.075)
0.020 0.039
(0.051) (0.057)
0.065**
(0.016)
es Yes Yes Yes
es Yes Yes Yes
es Yes Yes Yes
es Yes Yes Yes
es Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
,688 103,688 103,688 102,570
attainment categories. State level controls include urbanization rates, GDP
nufacturing, exports and imports. Establishment controls include average
s in eight age groups, four education groups, and ﬁve occupational groups.
state level, are in parentheses.
001).
Table 9. Formal sector migration in Brazil: Workers with a job change.
Dependent variable: Migration prob. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Job characteristics
Predicted wage diﬀ. ðbY cm  bY csÞ 0.010** 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Worker characteristics
Tenure wage proﬁle in t 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Tenure wage proﬁle in t þ 1 0.0006
(0.004)
Empl. at foreign establ. in t 0.008* 0.008* 0.009*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Empl. at foreign establ. in t þ 1 0.0002
(0.002)
Empl. at exporting establ. in t 0.003* 0.003* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Empl. at exporting establ. in t þ 1 0.002*
(0.002)
State characteristics related to globalization
Share of foreign establ. in t 0.051 0.005
(0.097) (0.092)
Share of foreign establ. in t þ 1 0.875*
(0.404)
Share of exporting establ. in t 0.470 0.566
(0.255) (0.312)
Share of exporting establ. in t þ 1 0.323*
(0.083)
Worker controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Emigration establ. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Emigration state ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Emigration state controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Immigration establ. controls Yes
Immigration state controls Yes
Number of observations 105,222 56,836 56,836 56,836 46,280
Notes: The sample is restricted to workers with a year-to-year job change. Worker cells are formed by eight age, two gender, and four educational
attainment categories. State level controls include urbanization rates, GDP per capita, average state wages, value added from agriculture, services, and
manufacturing, exports and imports. Establishment controls include average wages, number of workers, the share of female workers, and the share of
workers in eight age groups, four education groups, and ﬁve occupational groups. Regressions are weighted by cell size. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the state level, are in parentheses.
Sources: RAIS (1% random sample), IBGE, RDE–IED, and SECEX (1997–2001).
* Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
852 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthe share of exporting establishments in the state, an increase
in the share of the cell employed at an exporting establishment
of 10% (one standard deviation) relates to a 3% drop in the
probability of migration.
The descriptive evidence in Table 4 above showed that
workers at exporters and multinational enterprises are mark-
edly more likely to move to another exporter or multinational
enterprise when changing jobs, than workers at non-exporters
or domestic establishments. A concern is therefore that omit-
ting variables related to the worker’s employment and location
after migration could drive results in columns (1)–(4). We ad-
dress this concern by including variables for the immigration
state and immigration establishment in speciﬁcation (5). 29
Employment at an exporting establishment in the initial year
continues to be negatively related to internal migration,
though it loses signiﬁcance. Migration is signiﬁcantly nega-tively related to employment at an exporter after the migration
decision and the share of exporters at the immigration loca-
tion. These results are in line with evidence in Table 4 that
non-migrants with a job change more often ﬁnd re-employ-
ment at exporting establishments than migrants.
Migration is signiﬁcantly positively related with a larger
share of multinational enterprises at the immigration location,
however. A 10% increase in the concentration of foreign
owned establishments at potential immigration locations is
associated with a 1.8% increase in the migration rate. This re-
sult is consistent with the idea that locations which attract
multinational enterprises are also economically appealing
locations for domestic formal sector migrants.
The results of our multivariate analysis corroborate the
descriptive ﬁndings in Section 4 and provide support for the
idea that globalization acts on internal migration through
GLOBALIZATION AND FORMAL SECTOR MIGRATION IN BRAZIL 853the growth of employment opportunities at locations with a
high concentration of foreign owned establishments and the
stability of employment at exporting establishments: a 10% in-
crease in exporter employment relates to a 3% reduced proba-
bility of migration, and a 10% increase in the concentration of
foreign owned establishments at potential immigration loca-
tions relates to a 2% increase in the migration rate. The impor-
tance of foreign owned establishments in the immigration
region, beyond the spot wage, is consistent with the economic
rationale that migrants can expect beneﬁts beyond the spot
wage diﬀerential, such as steeper wage paths at foreign owned
establishments (Figure 3) or more favorable labor market con-
ditions in areas where multinational enterprises locate. The
magnitudes of the migration ﬂow changes, predicted by expor-
ter employment and the concentration of foreign owned estab-
lishments at the destination location, are potentially large,
given an annual overall migration rate of only 2%.
(d) Robustness check
We now check the robustness of the main results in Table 8
to within-state job changes. All migrants change jobs. But
there are job changers who do not move across state borders
and become part of the non-migrant group. Table 3 docu-
mented that between one-half and two-thirds of all workers re-
main in the same job from year-to-year. Among workers with
a year-over-year job change, approximately one in ﬁve work-
ers remains in the same state. Until now, our analysis has con-
sidered both of these sets of workers as identical stayers. But
within-state job changers arguably also respond to wage diﬀer-
ences in their job change, so that the wage prediction for mi-
grants in Eqn. (1) is understated even after migration
selectivity correction because cross-state migrants might only
move in response to an additional wage diﬀerential that com-
pensates for cross-state migration costs. As a consequence, we
might expect the coeﬃcient on the wage diﬀerential in Eqn. (3)
for the probability of cross-state migration to be underesti-
mated.
Our current framework relating globalization factors to
interstate migration can be decomposed into two decisions:
ﬁrst, the decision to change jobs or remain in the same job;
and second, conditional on job change, the decision to move
within-state or migrate out of state. The conventional Dahl
(2002) framework does not separately identify the two deci-
sions. A worker without a job change typically does not mi-
grate out of state (except for the rare occasion when a
worker transfers within a ﬁrm) and a worker who migrates
across state lines must change jobs.
In order to separate the cross-state migration decision from
the within-state job change decision, we limit the sample to
workers with a job change. In Brazil, close to 80% of the
approximately 40% of workers who separate from their job
are laid oﬀ by the employer (only 20% quit their current job
voluntarily). So, for most workers, the job-separation decision
is not under the worker’s control. For four in ﬁve workers with
a job separation, the only decision is whether to move within-
state or to migrate across state borders. So, we can estimate
the likelihood of formal sector migration across states condi-
tional on a worker’s job change year over year. When we fur-
ther restrict the robustness sample to only workers who were
laid oﬀ, excluding quitters, we ﬁnd largely comparable results.
As in the conventional Dahl (2002) framework from before,
we ﬁrst treat the self-selection problem inherent in the migra-
tion decision and estimate a maximum likelihood model of
selectivity corrected wages following Heckman (1979), now
only for the subsample of workers with a year-to-year jobchange. Appendix Table A.1 reports the selectivity corrected
maximum likelihood estimates. Results are comparable to
the earlier results in Table 7 for the complete set of workers. 30
From this regression, we predict selectivity corrected wages
for the set of job changing workers in all 27 Brazilian states as
migrants (across-state job changers) and as stayers (within-
state job changers). We then follow Dahl (2002) to estimate
the worker’s multi-destination migration decision as described
in Section 5. Table 9 reports results from Eqn. (3) for the sub-
sample of workers with a job change. As in Table 8, all regres-
sions are weighted by the number of workers in each cell,
standard errors are clustered at the emigration state level,
and annual time dummies are included.
Controlling for cell characteristics, time varying emigration
establishment characteristics, and emigration state characteris-
tics in column (4), the interstate wage diﬀerential remains pos-
itively signiﬁcantly related to the worker’s cross-state
migration decision. For the subsample of workers with a job
change, a 1% increase in the spot wage diﬀerential is now asso-
ciated with a 0.9% increase in the probability of migration.
This coeﬃcient estimate is roughly ﬁve times larger than the
one in Table 8. In other words, the same wage diﬀerential in-
duces workers who just suﬀered a separation ﬁve times more
frequently into a cross-state migration than the average work-
er. This is consistent with the idea that migration ﬁxed costs
are particularly high for workers with a stable employment
so that wage diﬀerentials need to be ﬁve times higher to trigger
cross-state migration for an average worker than for a worker
who just suﬀered a separation. More precisely, a one standard
deviation higher wage diﬀerential is associated with a 1.8% in-
crease in the migration probability for all workers and a 8.7%
increase in the migration probability for workers with a job
change. As expected, the negative omitted variable bias from
non-migrants with a job change reinforces the negative self-
selection into job change, by which low earning workers are
more likely to change jobs. Similarly, the expectation of higher
future wages in the current establishment, as proxied by the
establishment level 30-year tenure wage proﬁle, signiﬁcantly
reduces the likelihood of cross-state migration.
Our focal results remain largely unchanged. Controlling for
the share of exporting and foreign owned establishments in the
state, employment at an exporting establishment is negatively
correlated with formal sector interstate migration. A 1% in-
crease in the share of the cell employed at an exporting estab-
lishment reduces the probability of migration by 0.3%. For the
subsample of job changers, prior employment at a foreign
owned establishment is also negatively associated with cross-
state migration. A 1% increase in the cell share employed at
a foreign owned establishment is related to a reduction in
the frequency of migration of approximately 0.8%. This evi-
dence is consistent with the geographic concentration of for-
eign owned and exporting establishments. Finally, migration
remains positively correlated with the share of foreign enter-
prises at the immigration location (column (5)).6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigates how factors related to globalization
are associated with internal migration ﬂows in a developing
country. Using Brazil’s comprehensive linked employer–em-
ployee data that cover all federal states and sectors of the
economy, we document that domestic formal sector migration
ﬂows are directed to destinations with a high concentration of
foreign owned establishments during 1997–2001. Workers
who are employed at exporting establishments are less likely
854 WORLD DEVELOPMENTto migrate. Our estimation approach corrects for the self-selec-
tion of migrants and controls for interstate wage diﬀerentials
as well as worker and state characteristics. Workers face a
joint decision of whether to change jobs and, conditional on
job change, whether to move within-state or migrate across
states. Our focal estimates for the association between migra-
tion and employer and state characteristics are robust to the
presence of within-state job changers, but the derivation and
implementation of a rigorous estimation framework, which
separates the causal eﬀects of wage diﬀerentials on within-state
job changes from the eﬀects on migration ﬂows, remains an
interesting task for future econometric research.
Findings of our descriptive analysis are consistent with the
idea that globalization acts on internal migration through
employment beneﬁts at foreign owned establishments, beyond
spot wage diﬀerentials, and job stability at exporting establish-ments. Given annual formal sector migration rates of around
2%, the magnitude of globalization predicted migration ﬂows
are potentially large. A 1% increase in exporter employment is
associated with a 0.3% reduced probability of migration, and a
1% increase in the concentration of foreign owned establish-
ments at potential migration destinations relates to approxi-
mately a 0.2% increase in the migration rate.
Recent research advances the hypothesis that return migra-
tion may be a leading cause of the large and unprecedented
ﬂows of people from Southern to Northern regions in Brazil
(Fiess & Verner, 2003 for a discussion and an opposing view
based on evidence from a household cross-section). Our ﬁnd-
ings support the view that the now frequent relocation of for-
eign owned and exporting establishments to the Northern and
Northeastern states may be one potential reason for return
migration from the South and Southeast.NOTES1. At the core of the Harris and Todaro (1970) model is a pool of
informal and unemployed workers in urban centers, to which rural
migrants are attracted because there is a probability that they will be lifted
out of informality into formal urban employment at a premium over the
rural wage.
2. Au and Henderson (2006) argue that internal migration restrictions in
China led to insuﬃcient agglomeration of economic activity and resulted
in signiﬁcant productivity losses for the country.
3. The high average GDP per capita in the Center-West region is
misleading, as the capital city in the Distrito Federal (DF) largely drives
the results; the median per capita GDP for the region is only US$ 5,925.
Per capita GDP in the Distrito Federal is the highest in the country (US$
13,604), compared to only US$ 4,403 in neighboring Goia´s (GO) state.
4. Graham (1970), Martine (1990, chap. 2) and Schmertmann (1992)
provide a detailed history of the Brazilian migration experience.
5. Our data do not include family variables like marital status or the
number of children, however, which prior research has shown to be
associated with migration. Inasmuch as family variables are related to
prior workforce experience, we can control for their impact on migration
selection because we observe workforce experience at the individual level.
6. Examples of such state promoted production arrangements include
tropical horticulture in Amazonas (AM) state, furniture manufacturing in
Acre (AC), software programming in the Distrito Federal, and apparel
clusters in several states such as Goia´s (GO), Rio Grande do Norte (RN),
Paraı´ba (PB), and Sergipe (SE).
7. A worker’s ID generally remains with the worker throughout his or
her work history. The process for establishments to report on their
workers is extensive and costly. However, RAIS records are used to
administer payment of the annual public wage supplements to every
formally employed worker, thus creating a strong incentive for workers to
urge their employers to report accurately.
8. Educational attainment is deﬁned as the level of schooling completed
in nine categories.
9. Eleven digits is the traditional length of a PIS number in Brazil.
Shorter PIS numbers are defective and not traceable over time. Firms that
enter false identiﬁcation numbers could be reporting informal workers, or
have faulty bookkeeping.10. We use the information for the years 1997–2001 when we also have
complementary data.11. Consider the following examples. An establishment with foreign
investment inﬂows in 1997 and 1998 and a stock of foreign capital in
2001 is classiﬁed as a foreign owned establishment for the years 1997–
2001. If an establishment with foreign inﬂows in 1997 and 1998 records
no stock of foreign capital by 2001, the establishment is classiﬁed as
foreign owned for 1997 and 1998 only. Finally, an establishment with a
positive stock of foreign investment in 2001, but without any recorded
inﬂows over the period 1996–2001, is classiﬁed as foreign owned for the
years 1996–2001.
12. While it is possible to incorporate the level of exports, we opt to
denote exporting establishments with a dummy indicator variable for
consistency with the information on foreign owned enterprises. Moreover,
without establishment information on production, it is unclear how we
should scale exports.
13. Of the 1,005,010 total worker-year observations, almost half (161,540
workers) can be traced for the entire sample period, while about a quarter
(93,403 workers) can only be traced for two consecutive periods.
Approximately 20% of workers are traced for three consecutive years (or
two times two consecutive years) and approximately 12% of workers are
traced for four consecutive years (or three times two consecutive years).
14. Death and retirement are reported in RAIS but account for only a
minor fraction of workers who cannot be traced. The RAIS data do not
allow us to decompose exits from the formal sector. Using household data,
Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007) estimate that just over two-thirds of
workers with a job separation enter the informal sector or become self-
employed, while about one-third become unemployed or leave the labor
force.
15. In order to ensure that the results that follow are not driven by these
workers with multiple migration episodes, we repeat the analysis for a
single 4-year (1997–2001) migration horizon (approximately 5% of formal
sector workers are employed in a diﬀerent state in 2001 than the state of
employment in 1997). Our main conclusions are unchanged when we
exclude multiple migration episodes.
16. The fact that one-third of formal sector job switchers are cross-state
migrants is of particular importance to the conduct of repeated household
surveys, which invariably classify these households as missing and thus
potentially exaggerate transitions into unemployment.
GLOBALIZATION AND FORMAL SECTOR MIGRATION IN BRAZIL 85517. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2007) analyze this type of transition
using household data.
18. Poole (2009) analyzes the impact of multinational-to-domestic
worker mobility.
19. Approximately 2,000 workers migrate without changing jobs—
workers who transfer within the ﬁrm or workers living in border areas.
20. We deﬁne a rich (poor) state to be a state with above (below) average
per capita GDP for the sample period (see Table 1).
21. For a complete state-to-state transition matrix, please contact the
authors.
22. Borjas (1987) posits a negative selection of cross-border migrants,
whereas Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) document that Mexican immi-
grants to the United States are more educated than Mexican non-
migrants.
23. Women earn 41% less than men; wages are increasing in the level of
education and increasing with age, at a decreasing rate.
24. This result, however, does not necessarily run contrary to commonly
found regional migration patterns: states like Goia´s often attract workers
from states with higher per capita income, such as Minas Gerais and the
capital city (Distrito Federal). Similarly, many migrants from Sa˜o Paulo
arrive in neighboring Parana´ (PR) state, despite the lower per capita GDP.25. Professional and managerial, technical, other white collar, skilled
blue collar, and unskilled blue collar.
26. Child (10–14 yrs.), youth (15–17 yrs.), adolescent (18–24 yrs.),
nascent career (25–29 yrs.), early career (30–39 yrs.), peak career (40–49
yrs.), late career (50–64 yrs.), and post-retirement (65+).
27. Primary school (grade 8 or less), high school graduate (grade 9–12),
college dropout and college graduate.
28. In principle, migrants from 27 states to 26 states over four years in
eight age groups, two gender groups and four education groups would
make for 179,712 cells. But cells with no observations drop from the
transformed sample (e.g., college educated, peak career, women from
Tocantins in 1998).
29. A more rigorous treatment of immigration employer and immigra-
tion state predictors would require estimation of diﬀerences in emigration
immigration characteristics similar to the two-step approach for spot
wages. The derivation and implementation of an according statistical
model remains a task for future research.
30. Women earn less than men; wages are increasing in the level of
education and increasing with age, at a decreasing rate. Women are less
likely to migrate than men, workers with at least some college are most
likely to migrate, and the migration probability decreases with age. The
higher are state average wages and value added in agriculture and
manufacturing, the less likely is a worker to emigrate.REFERENCESAbowd, J. M., Kramarz, F., & Margolis, D. N. (1999). High wage workers
and high wage ﬁrms. Econometrica, 67(2), 251–333.
Amaral-Filho, J. (2001). A endogeneizaca˜o no desenvolvimento econoˆm-
ico regional e local. Planejamento e Polı´ticas Pu´blicas, 23(7), 261–286.
Amaral-Filho, J. (2003). Ajustes estruturais, novas formas de intervenca˜o
pu´blica e regime de crescimento econoˆmico no Ceara´. In M. F.
Goncalves, C. A. Branda˜o, & A. C. Galva˜o (Eds.), Regio˜es e Cidades,
Cidades nas Regio˜es: O Desaﬁo Urbano-Regional (pp. 367–385). Sa˜o
Paulo: UNESP.
Au, C.-C., & Henderson, J. V. (2006). How migration restrictions limit
agglomeration and productivity in China. Journal of Development
Economics, 80(2), 350–388.
Bittencourt, M. V. L., Larson, D. W., & Kraybill, D. L. (2008). A
liberalizaca˜o comercial e os seus impactos regionais sobre a pobreza e a
distribuica˜o de renda no Brasil. Pesquisa e Planejamento Econoˆmico,
38(1), 127–166.
Borjas, G. J. (1987). Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants.
American Economic Review, 77(4), 531–553.
Chiquiar, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2005). International migration, self-
selection, and the distribution of wages: Evidence from Mexico and the
United States. Journal of Political Economy, 113(2), 239–281.
Dahl, G. B. (2002). Mobility and the returns to education: Testing a Roy
model with multiple markets. Econometrica, 70(6), 2367–2420.
Feenstra, R. C., Lipsey, R. E., Deng, H., Ma, A. C., & Mo, H. (2005).
World trade ﬂows: 2005. NBER Working Paper 11040.
Fiess, N. M., & Verner, D. (2003). Migration and human capital in Brazil
during the 1990s. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3093.
Graham, D. H. (1970). Divergent and convergent regional economic
growth and internal migration in Brazil: 1940–1960. Economic Devel-
opment and Cultural Change, 18(3), 362–382.
Harris, J., & Todaro, M. (1970). Migration, unemployment, and devel-
opment: A two-sector analysis. American Economic Review, 60,
126–142.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a speciﬁcation error.
Econometrica, 47(1).
Lastres, H. M. M., Cassiolato, J. E., & Campos, R. (2006). Arranjos e
sistemas produtivos e inovativos locais: Vantagens e enfoque. In H. M.M. Lastres, & J. E. Cassiolato (Eds.). Estrate´gias para o Desenvolvi-
mento: Um Enfoque sobre Arranjos Produtivos Locais do Norte,
Nordeste e Centro-Oeste Brasileiro (pp. 13–28). Rio de Janeiro:
Instituto de Economia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.
Martine, G. (1990). Brazil. In C. B. Nam, W. J. Serow, & D. F. Sly (Eds.).
International Handbook of Internal Migration (pp. 31–46). New York:
Greenwood Press.
Meier, G. M., & Rauch, J. E. (2005). Leading issues in economic
development. New York: Oxford University Press.
Menezes-Filho, N. A., & Muendler, M.-A. (2007). Labor reallocation in
response to trade reform. CESifo Working Paper 1936.
Menezes-Filho, N. A., Muendler, M.-A., & Ramey, G. (2008). The
structure of worker compensation in Brazil, with a comparison to
France and the United States. Review of Economics and Statistics,
90(2), 324–346.
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience, and earnings. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Poole, J. P. (2009). Knowledge transfers from multinational to domestic
ﬁrms: Evidence from worker mobility. University of California Santa
Cruz, Unpublished manuscript.
Roy, A. D. (1951). Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings. Oxford
Economic Papers, 3, 135–146.
Sahota, G. S. (1968). An economic analysis of internal migration in Brazil.
Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 218–245.
Schmertmann, C. P. (1992). Estimation of historical migration rates from
a single census: Interregional migration in Brazil 1900–1980. Popula-
tion Studies, 46(1), 103–120.
Yap, L. (1976). Internal migration and economic development in Brazil.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(1), 119–137.APPENDIX A
See Table A.1.
Table A.1. Selectivity corrected wage estimation for workers with a job change.
Dependent variable: Log wage in t þ 1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome equation: Log Wage
Female 0.362** 0.366** 0.216** 0.169**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014)
High school graduate 0.447** 0.426** 0.214** 0.201**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Some college 1.130** 1.092** 0.555** 0.476**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023)
College graduate 1.598** 1.561** 0.896** 0.842**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
Age at t þ 1 0.067** 0.069** 0.035** 0.027**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age at t þ 1 squared 0.001** 0.001** 0.0002** 0.0001**
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Selection equation: Migrate
Female 0.303** 0.303** 0.302** 0.304**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
High school graduate 0.006 0.006 0.013 0.019*
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Some college 0.159** 0.159** 0.171** 0.184**
(0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
College graduate 0.119** 0.119** 0.128** 0.144**
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
Age at t 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Urbanization at t 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.020
(0.065) (0.049) (0.049) (0.066)
GDP per capita at t 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Log average state wages at t 0.218** 0.218** 0.216** 0.208**
(0.039) (0.029) (0.029) (0.040)
Log value added in agriculture at t 0.010* 0.010* 0.012* 0.014**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Log value added in manufacturing at t 0.195** 0.195** 0.193** 0.190**
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Log value added in services at t 0.129** 0.129** 0.129** 0.126**
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
Fixed eﬀects: state at t þ 1 Yes Yes Yes
Establishment controls at t þ 1 Yes Yes
Establishment controls at t Yes
Number of observations 206,418 206,418 206,041 205,369
Notes: The sample is restricted to workers with a year-to-year job change. Establishment controls include average wages, number of workers, the share of
female workers, and the share of workers in eight age groups, four education groups, and ﬁve occupational groups. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
Sources: RAIS (1% random sample) and IBGE (1997–2001).
* Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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